Mahmoud Khalil’s legal battle with the Trump administration is heading toward the Supreme Court, and the central question isn’t whether the government can deport him. At least, not yet. It’s whether a federal district judge can order his release from immigration detention before he completes the immigration appeals process.

Yesterday, Khalil, a lawful permanent resident and former Columbia University graduate student, asked the Supreme Court to overturn a January ruling by the Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. That court determined that federal immigration law prevented a district judge from granting the relief Khalil sought while his immigration proceedings were still underway. The decision reversed a lower court’s intervention that had secured Khalil’s release after more than three months in detention. For now, the appeals court’s ruling remains on hold while he pursues Supreme Court review.

The controversy raises some important questions about immigration enforcement, freedom of speech, judicial authority, and the constitutional protections available to noncitizens. And, as usual, Washington has managed to turn what sounds like a procedural dispute into a constitutional showdown.

One Legal Highway, No Unauthorized Exits

Congress Drew the Map and Judges Have to Follow It

The strongest argument supporting the Third Circuit’s ruling begins with a straightforward constitutional principle: Congress establishes the jurisdiction of lower federal courts within constitutional limits, and judges must respect those boundaries. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), Congress created a specific process for reviewing legal questions arising from removal proceedings.

Generally, an individual must first present arguments before an immigration judge, pursue an appeal through the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and then seek judicial review in a federal court of appeals. The purpose is to consolidate related legal challenges into a single review process rather than allowing several courts to issue potentially conflicting decisions at different stages.

In Khalil’s case, the Third Circuit concluded that his constitutional claims were sufficiently connected to his removal proceedings that they belonged within this established framework. Importantly, the appeals court didn’t hold that the district court lacked ordinary habeas jurisdiction altogether. It determined that the INA prevented the court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over these particular claims at that stage. Supporters argue that allowing a district judge to bypass this arrangement would undermine Congress’s authority to establish orderly immigration procedures.

Too Many Courts Spoil the Court Order

Another argument concerns the practical consequences of permitting parallel legal proceedings. Khalil’s case illustrates the potential complications. While a federal district judge in New Jersey was considering the constitutionality of his detention and the government’s foreign-policy justification for removal, an immigration judge in Louisiana was separately deciding whether Khalil was legally removable.

The immigration judge found him removable under a foreign-policy provision of the INA and on separate allegations that he had misrepresented material information when obtaining immigration status. The district court, meanwhile, concluded that Khalil was likely to succeed in challenging the foreign-policy ground, restricted the government’s ability to rely on it, and eventually ordered his release. These proceedings generated conflicting directives about how the government should handle his removal case.

Supporters of the Third Circuit’s decision argue that this demonstrates precisely why Congress sought to consolidate immigration litigation. Without clear jurisdictional boundaries, district judges and immigration authorities could reach conflicting conclusions concerning the same underlying proceedings. The resulting uncertainty could complicate enforcement, prolong litigation, and make it difficult to determine which orders control.

National Security Isn’t a Local Court’s Side Project

Immigration decisions also involve national sovereignty, foreign relations, and executive authority. Secretary of State Marco Rubio invoked a provision of federal immigration law permitting removal when a noncitizen’s presence or activities could have serious adverse foreign-policy consequences. The administration alleged that Khalil’s participation in pro-Palestinian activism contributed to an antisemitic and disruptive environment at Columbia University.

Those allegations remain contested, but supporters of the ruling emphasize that Congress has granted the executive branch substantial responsibilities in immigration and foreign-policy matters. They argue that permitting individual district judges to intervene before administrative proceedings are completed could weaken the government’s ability to implement national immigration policies consistently.

The argument doesn’t require accepting every allegation against Khalil. Instead, it rests on the principle that courts should respect the procedures Congress established for evaluating those allegations. Under this interpretation, the government retains authority to pursue removal, while the judiciary reviews the legality of that action through the designated appellate process.

A Delayed Hearing Isn’t Necessarily a Denied Hearing

Perhaps the most significant element of the Third Circuit’s reasoning is its distinction between postponing judicial review and eliminating it. The majority concluded that Khalil would still have an opportunity to raise his constitutional arguments through a petition for review following the administrative process. That opportunity matters because the Constitution doesn’t necessarily guarantee immediate district court review of every legal challenge. Courts routinely require litigants to exhaust particular remedies before pursuing further judicial relief.

The majority also reasoned that immigration appellate procedures provide mechanisms for addressing problems with an incomplete administrative record, including certain opportunities for additional fact-finding. From this perspective, the ruling doesn’t permanently close the courthouse doors. It simply requires Khalil to follow the legally prescribed route. Supporters therefore characterize the decision as a defense of judicial restraint, congressional authority, and orderly legal proceedings rather than an endorsement of the administration’s underlying allegations.

Liberty Doesn’t Come with a Take-a-Number Machine

Habeas Corpus Has Been Around Longer Than Immigration Paperwork

Opponents begin with one of the oldest protections against unlawful government detention: habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus allows individuals to challenge the legal basis of their confinement before a court. Its historical purpose is to prevent the government from imprisoning people without meaningful judicial oversight. The Constitution specifically protects the privilege of the writ through the Suspension Clause, subject to limited exceptions.

Critics of the Third Circuit’s ruling argue that requiring someone to complete an extended immigration process before challenging allegedly unconstitutional detention undermines this fundamental safeguard. A person can have legitimate grounds to contest detention independently of whether the government ultimately has authority to remove that person. For example, the government might possess a legally valid reason to initiate deportation proceedings while simultaneously using detention for an impermissible purpose.

A challenge to that detention, critics argue, shouldn’t automatically have to wait until the deportation proceedings conclude. Otherwise, individuals could spend months or years in custody before an independent federal court fully examines whether their detention was constitutional.

Freedom of Speech Has No Refund Policy

Khalil’s attorneys argue that his detention was retaliation for constitutionally protected political expression. The First Amendment generally protects lawful permanent residents against government retaliation for protected speech, even when their political views are controversial or unpopular. The administration maintains that its actions were justified under federal immigration law and by concerns about Khalil’s activities. The constitutional question, however, is whether the government can detain someone because of protected political expression rather than because of independently lawful grounds.

Critics contend that postponing judicial review creates a particular problem in cases involving free speech. If detention prevents someone from exercising First Amendment rights, a favorable ruling months or years later can’t restore the lost opportunities to speak, organize, or participate in public debate. This is especially relevant when a detention itself allegedly serves to discourage others from expressing similar views.

Judge Arianna Freeman, dissenting from the Third Circuit’s jurisdictional conclusion, argued that at least some of Khalil’s claims involved injuries that couldn’t meaningfully be remedied through later review. Under that reasoning, requiring exhaustion before judicial intervention could allow the alleged constitutional injury to continue while the legal process unfolds.

Deportation and Detention Aren’t Identical Twins

A central argument against the ruling concerns the distinction between determining whether someone may legally remain in the United States and determining whether that person may lawfully be detained. These are related questions, but they’re not necessarily identical.

Immigration courts possess authority to determine removability and evaluate available immigration relief. Federal district courts, meanwhile, traditionally exercise habeas jurisdiction to examine certain challenges to unlawful confinement.

Opponents argue that Khalil’s claims shouldn’t be treated exclusively as challenges to removal merely because they arise during immigration proceedings. He has asserted, among other things, that his detention was punitive and violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. That claim raises a question about the lawfulness and purpose of detention itself.

During the appeals process, dissenting judges emphasized that certain constitutional challenges to detention can stand independently of disputes over removability. They also questioned the majority’s interpretation of existing precedent, including Jennings v. Rodriguez, which addressed federal jurisdiction over immigration-detention claims. Under this interpretation, Congress’s decision to consolidate challenges to removal orders shouldn’t automatically eliminate district court jurisdiction over distinct constitutional injuries.

When Justice Arrives After the Damage

Opponents also question whether the immigration appeals process can provide an adequate remedy for unconstitutional detention. The Third Circuit majority reasoned that Khalil’s legal arguments could eventually be evaluated through the statutory review process. But critics distinguish between obtaining a legal ruling and receiving meaningful relief. If someone has already spent months in confinement for an unconstitutional reason, a later judgment may establish that the detention was unlawful without restoring the liberty lost during that period. The same problem arises when detention allegedly interferes with protected speech.

Additionally, immigration judges operate within the executive branch rather than the independent federal judiciary. Their authority to invalidate federal statutes on constitutional grounds is limited, and administrative proceedings don’t necessarily provide the same opportunities for developing evidence concerning constitutional retaliation. Critics therefore argue that immediate federal judicial review serves an essential function when someone alleges that the government is using detention itself to violate constitutional rights.

This concern extends well beyond Khalil. A similar dispute involving Georgetown University scholar Badar Khan Suri produced a different result in the Fourth Circuit, which permitted a challenge to immigration detention to proceed. That disagreement among federal appeals courts adds weight to the argument that the Supreme Court should clarify the relationship between immigration procedures and habeas protections.

The Constitution Shouldn’t Have to Wait in Line

I believe the Third Circuit’s ruling goes too far, and the Supreme Court should reverse it to the extent that it prevents prompt federal court consideration of genuinely independent constitutional challenges to immigration detention. Not because I agree with Mahmoud Khalil’s political views. Not because I believe the federal government lacks authority to enforce immigration laws. And certainly not because allegations of antisemitic harassment deserve to be dismissed as harmless campus politics. They don’t.

Antisemitism, threats, intimidation, and violence deserve serious attention, regardless of which political movement produces them. If Khalil engaged in conduct that violated legitimate laws, those allegations should be investigated and addressed through appropriate legal proceedings. Likewise, if the government can demonstrate that he obtained immigration status through material fraud, it has every right to pursue the consequences established by law.

A green card isn’t immunity from immigration enforcement. But neither is it a permission slip for the government to disregard constitutional protections. And that’s where the Third Circuit’s reasoning becomes difficult to accept.

The Government’s Authority Has Boundaries

Congress unquestionably has broad authority over immigration. The executive branch has substantial responsibilities in enforcing those laws, and federal judges can’t simply disregard jurisdictional restrictions because they dislike an administration’s policies. Those principles deserve respect. But judicial restraint cuts both ways. Courts must respect congressional authority without interpreting jurisdictional statutes more broadly than Congress intended, particularly when doing so could interfere with fundamental constitutional protections.

The difference between challenging deportation and challenging punitive detention isn’t some clever legal technicality. It can determine whether a person receives meaningful protection against unlawful government action. Suppose an administration detains a lawful permanent resident specifically to punish speech it finds politically inconvenient. Should that individual be required to remain in custody while navigating months of administrative proceedings before an independent federal judge can meaningfully consider the constitutional injury? I don’t believe so.

That doesn’t mean every immigration detainee is entitled to immediate release simply by mentioning the First Amendment. A district court should evaluate the legal sufficiency of the claim, its jurisdiction, the evidence, the government’s justification, and the requirements for granting relief. The government must have an opportunity to defend its actions. But the courthouse should remain available when the alleged violation concerns the detention itself and can’t adequately be remedied afterward.

Rights Aren’t Reserved for People We Like

There’s also an uncomfortable political temptation here. Conservatives who have spent years warning about government censorship, political retaliation, and the weaponization of federal agencies should be especially careful about defending expansive executive power simply because the current administration is exercising it against someone whose views they oppose. The principle becomes rather less impressive when it only applies to people wearing the correct political jersey.

The First Amendment doesn’t require us to approve of someone’s speech before recognizing its protection. And the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause speaks of protecting persons, not merely citizens or people whose opinions happen to be popular. Those protections don’t prevent the government from enforcing valid immigration laws. But they do require the government to respect constitutional boundaries while doing so.

The obligation to administer justice fairly shouldn’t change according to someone’s popularity, nationality, or political convictions. Proverbs 21:3 reminds us, “To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to the LORD than sacrifice.” That principle should encourage consistency, especially when fairness requires defending the rights of someone we strongly disagree with.

A Narrow Ruling Would Be Better

The Supreme Court doesn’t need to declare Khalil immune from deportation, endorse his activism, or dismantle the immigration review system. It should recognize that Congress has established legitimate administrative procedures while preserving prompt habeas review for distinct claims that detention itself violates constitutional rights.

That approach would respect both congressional authority and the judiciary’s traditional responsibility to safeguard individual liberty. It would also leave the government free to pursue lawful removal proceedings while requiring it to defend detention decisions that are challenged on independent constitutional grounds. And it would provide some badly needed clarity to lower courts that have reached different conclusions about the scope of their jurisdiction.

Ultimately, I believe the Third Circuit interpreted the INA too broadly in this case. Its approach creates a serious risk that individuals could remain unlawfully detained while waiting for an administrative process that can’t fully remedy the injury they allege. Whether Khalil’s particular claims ultimately warrant release is a separate question that should be decided after appropriate judicial examination, not settled indirectly by an overly expansive jurisdictional barrier.

So, the Supreme Court should reverse the Third Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling insofar as it prevents timely federal judicial review of independent constitutional challenges to detention. America can enforce its immigration laws, protect national security, combat antisemitism, and respect constitutional rights at the same time. Those responsibilities aren’t mutually exclusive.

And if the government believes its actions are lawful, allowing an independent judge to examine them shouldn’t be treated as an obstacle to justice. It should be recognized as one of the things that makes justice possible.