President Trump brought his favorite Apprentice line with him to the Oval Office and he’s been tossing it around Washington like it’s confetti at a New Year’s party. In recent news, we’ve got Maurene Comey (yep, James Comey’s daughter) suing the Justice Department after losing her job. But the real headliner? The Supreme Court stepping in to decide whether the president—Trump now, and whoever comes next—should have more power to hand pink slips to the bigwigs running “independent” agencies. You know, the ones that act independent of voters, presidents, and pretty much anyone but themselves.

The Lawsuit and the Supreme Court Showdown

Maurene was a federal prosecutor, but she claims her DOJ exit wasn’t about performance or policy but about her last name. In her view, she got caught in the blast radius of the Trump–Comey feud, even though she wasn’t the one clashing with the president on national TV. Now she’s suing, hoping to land her old job again, with a side of back pay as compensation for the family drama fallout.

And as if that weren’t enough courtroom theater, the Supreme Court has jumped in with a blockbuster case: should the president have the power to fire the so-called independent heavyweights running federal agencies, or can Congress keep them wrapped in “for cause” bubble wrap that makes them tougher to remove than a cockroach in a rent-controlled New York apartment.

This isn’t a brand-new fight; it’s been simmering for nearly a century. Back in 1935, the Supreme Court decided Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which basically said presidents couldn’t just fire Federal Trade Commission members without good reason. The Court’s logic was that some agencies need to be shielded from raw politics so they can act more like referees than cheerleaders. Then, in 1988’s Morrison v. Olson, the Court upheld limits on firing independent counsels, reinforcing the idea that certain watchdogs should be insulated from presidential wrath.

But in more recent years, the pendulum has started swinging back. In 2020’s Seila Law v. CFPB, the Court ruled that the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was unconstitutional because its director couldn’t be easily fired by the president. That case cracked the door open for a stronger executive hand over agencies. Now, President Trump’s firing of an FTC commissioner has shoved that door wide open, daring the justices to decide whether it’s time to finally scrap the “Humphrey’s Executor” precedent and let presidents clean house when they see fit.

So, the stakes are high. If the Court sides with Trump, presidents gain the freedom to sweep out resistant agency heads and actually steer the policy ship the voters elected them to sail. If the Court rules against him, then these agencies stay perched on their pedestals: little bureaucratic kingdoms where officials can outlast presidents, Congresses, and sometimes even voters’ patience.

Why Give the President a Bigger Pink Slip Pen?

Here’s the blunt truth: nobody ever walked into a voting booth and thought, “You know who I really want setting national policy? The deputy under-chair of the Federal Trade Commission.” Yet these unelected agency chiefs—whether at the FTC, the SEC, the EPA, or any other alphabet-soup corner of Washington—shape everything from your electric bill to the fine print on your mortgage. They may not have campaign ads or yard signs, but they wield enormous power over daily life.

That’s why supporters of expanding the president’s firing authority argue it all comes down to accountability. If the president is the one taking the heat for inflation and energy costs, shouldn’t he also have the authority to oversee—and yes, fire—the officials making those regulatory calls? Otherwise, we’re basically blaming the quarterback for the game while the referees secretly rewrite the playbook.

And let’s drop the polite fiction: these agencies aren’t really “independent.” They’re funded by Congress, staffed through political appointments, and shaped by the very same partisan winds everyone else in D.C. breathes.

Supporters say that letting presidents fire at will would cut through the fog and restore a basic principle: elections have consequences. If voters choose a president to take the country in a certain direction, then agency heads should follow that lead or at least not actively sabotage it.

And here’s the kicker: giving presidents more firing power might actually make bureaucrats more responsive to the public. Right now, too many of them act like monarchs of their little fiefdoms, knowing they can simply wait out the next administration. But if they know their jobs depend on aligning with the people’s elected leadership, suddenly that ivory tower might start looking more like a glass house.

The Dangers of a Presidential “You’re Fired” Free-for-All

Of course, not everyone is cheering for a presidential pink-slip parade. Critics warn that giving presidents broad firing power sounds less like good governance and more like setting up a reality show version of the federal government where anyone who doesn’t clap loud enough for the boss gets the boot. Their nightmare scenario is a president stacking agencies with nothing but loyalists, turning watchdogs into lapdogs armed with rubber stamps.

Independent agencies, after all, weren’t created by accident. The whole idea was to provide stability and continuity to make sure that the rules governing Wall Street, antitrust, energy, and consumer protection don’t swing wildly every time a new administration moves in. Imagine if the stock market had to brace itself for a total regulatory overhaul every four years; businesses might spend more time playing political roulette than actually investing.

There’s also the matter of pressure. Without job protections, regulators could start making decisions not based on the law or sound policy, but on whether it keeps them off the chopping block. Critics fear that would gut the very purpose of oversight, turning serious enforcement into little more than political theater.

And if we’re being honest, history does hand their argument some credibility. Unchecked executive power hasn’t exactly been humanity’s brightest idea. From monarchies to dictatorships, the Founding Fathers saw firsthand what happens when one person has too much control and they built a Constitution designed to spread power around like butter on toast.

So, the critics ask: do we really want to risk creating a system where agencies exist at the mercy of whoever’s holding the keys to the White House? Or is there some wisdom in keeping a little insulation between the president and the regulators who, at least in theory, are supposed to keep everybody honest?

The People Elected a President, Not the Bureaucrats

Independent agencies were originally pitched as referees: neutral arbiters who’d blow the whistle when necessary but stay out of the game. Somewhere along the line, though, the referees decided they liked holding the ball, calling the plays, and sticking around long after the clock ran out. Presidents may rotate in and out, but the agencies? They’re like permanent squatters in the machinery of government, humming along with leadership that rarely changes and policies that seem immune to elections. That isn’t accountability; it’s bureaucracy on autopilot.

Now, let’s be fair: there is a risk here. Expanding presidential firing power could, in theory, let a bad actor clear house and stack agencies with sycophants who care more about pleasing the boss than following the law. But here’s the thing, presidents already wield enormous power through appointments, executive orders, and regulatory agendas. Giving them the ability to remove rogue agency heads isn’t handing them a crown and scepter; it’s simply making sure voters can actually judge them for the results. After all, how can you hold a president accountable if half the team running the country doesn’t even answer to him?

So, here’s my verdict: expand the firing power. Let the president fire agency heads who refuse to carry out the vision the people elected him to implement. If he abuses that power, we already have a constitutional remedy: it’s called the ballot box. Don’t like the way the captain is steering the ship? Fire him at the next election. But don’t lock the wheel in the hands of unelected bureaucrats who were never chosen by the people in the first place.

Because at the end of the day, this really boils down to one question: do we want government by the people, or government by the permanent class of regulators who never stood on a ballot, never faced the voters, and never leave? To me, that sounds less like “checks and balances” and a whole lot more like the deluxe model of the deep state: fully loaded, zero accountability, and no off switch.